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Abstract 
Over the last two decades, the rise of microcredit has cast new light on the age-old 
question of how to provide credit to the poor. The attention paid to microcredit organizations 
however, tends to ignore the deeper historical legacy of microfinance, a legacy with important 
implications for designing successful future lending institutions. German credit cooperatives, 
which became popular in nineteenth-century Germany despite an already highly developed 
banking system, are one such example.  
This paper examines the social and political context which inspired the development of 
credit cooperatives before turning to arguments about why cooperatives were able to provide 
small long-term loans to borrowers without collateral. These arguments center on efficiency 
advantages cooperatives’ possessed over traditional institutions because of: (1) an ability to 
capitalize on superior information, and (2) an ability to effectively impose low-cost sanctions on 
members who have defaulted. Testing these hypotheses against the data yielded by the business 
records of the first rural credit cooperative founded in Germany, the Heddesdorf cooperative, 
this research provides qualified support for both efficiency arguments and reveals important 
considerations for current microfinance efforts. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
As academics increasingly acknowledge the importance of financial systems in fostering 
economic growth, more and more economists and policymakers are studying how these systems 
developed and what makes them effective.1 Imbedded in this discussion are important questions 
regarding equity in financial access. What is the best way for a society, an institution, or an 
individual to provide credit to those that are most in need of financial assistance? How can 
society structure loans so that they are at once low-risk to the creditor, affordable to the debtor, 
and sustainable through time? After all, the poor generally have no collateral, and the loans they 
seek are often too small for traditional financial institutions to find profitable. Yet rates of return 
for credit provided to the poor are significantly higher than credit extended to other sectors of 
                                                          
1
 Timothy W. Guinnane. “Delegated Monitors, Large and Small: Germany’s Banking System, 1800-1914.” Journal 
of Economic Literature, Vol. 40, No. 1. (Mar., 2002), 74. 
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society.2 And since over a billion people globally live in households with per capita incomes of 
less than one dollar per day, the ability to extend financial services to the poor could thus foster 
their independence, alleviate poverty for millions, and boost economic growth for everyone.3  
The recent rise of microcredit suggests a possible answer. Microcredit institutions extend 
small, short-term loans to specifically identified individuals. The chance of the debtors defaulting 
on these loans is then mitigated by enforcement mechanisms involving a mix of social and 
economic pressure. But the focus on these institutions ignores the historical development of 
microfinance and microcredit.4 In fact, efforts to address poverty through the establishment of 
credit associations began in earnest with the growth of the credit cooperative movement in the 
mid-nineteenth century. In pursuing their economic goals, these credit cooperatives used social 
relationships and other innovative institutional adaptations to extend financial access for the 
poor.  
This research focuses on the original Raiffeisen credit association founded in Germany 
by Friedrich Raiffeisen in 1864. The Heddesdorf credit cooperative, named for the small rural 
village in which it was located, was typical of later Raiffeisen credit cooperatives. By examining 
data on the loan activity of this cooperative from 1869 through 1883, we seek to examine several 
assertions surrounding why these credit cooperatives were able to operate successfully. Were the 
loans made by the Heddesdorf cooperative in this period consistent with claims made by the 
economist Timothy Guinnane that the success of the Raiffeisen cooperatives depended on the 
                                                          
2
 MD. Abul Quasem. “Credit Flowing from the Poor to the Rich—The Financial Market and the Role of the 
Grameen Bank in Rural Bangladesh.” The Developing Economies, Vol. 34, no. 4 (Dec., 2001), 1. This argument, 
which is a common one, operates on the assumption that a small loan to a very poor person will be spent and thus 
reinvested into the community, whereas a loan to someone who already has sufficient assets may just be saved or 
used for a less productive purpose.  
3
 Jonathan Morduch. “The Microfinance Promise.” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 37, no. 4 (Dec., 1999), 
1572. 
4
 Hans Dieter Seibel. "History Matters in Microfinance.” Small Enterprise Development, Vol. 14, no. 2 (June 2003), 
10. 
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promise of repeat loans for reliable borrowers?5 Did the institutional design of the Raiffeisen 
cooperatives also lower transaction costs, limit adverse selection, and create effective social 
capital mechanisms to ensure repayment?6 While the evidence yielded by the business records is 
descriptive in nature, the results suggest that the Heddesdorf credit cooperative may indeed have 
benefited from distinctive structural advantages that minimized risk and allowed for more cost-
effective loan enforcement.  
In limiting the danger of asymmetric information and illiquidity and creating mechanisms 
to ensure repayment, the Raiffeisen cooperative blended together both social and economic 
elements. Restricting membership to a single local community and harnessing the resulting 
network of relationships between members also meant the Raiffeisen cooperatives could more 
effectively address the specific credit needs of their rural communities. As a result of both their 
successful economic design and their adaptation to their social environment, the Raiffeisen 
association has grown to thousands of organizations throughout the world. Behind the story of its 
success may be important lessons for future microfinance institutions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 Maitreesh Ghatak and Timothy W. Guinnane. “The Economics of Lending and Joint Liability: Theory and 
Practice,” in Readings in the Theory of Economic Development, edited by Dilip Mookherjee and Debraj Ray (New 
York: Wiley-Blackwell, 2001), 412. 
6
 Ibid., 413. 
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Historical Background 
Credit cooperatives were first introduced in Germany in the 1850s, but mutual credit 
associations originated nearly a hundred years earlier following the end of the Seven Years’ War 
in the province of Silesia.7 Here, warfare had devastated the area’s infrastructure leaving 
everyone needing money and land unsalable. The founding of Germany’s oldest credit 
association, the Schlesische Landschaft, was a direct attempt to provide money and credit to the 
impoverished nobility in the area by allowing them to use their land to secure mortgages. This 
particular credit association was formed by all the noble land-owners of the province, whereby 
each became jointly liable for the payment of principal and interest of mortgage bonds. These 
bonds were issued to any one member of the association, and were not to exceed in amount one-
half the value of that member’s estate.8 Ultimately, the Schlesische Landschaft was an important 
part of efforts to restore the region’s economic activity.  
And its success quickly led to the establishment of further Landschaften throughout many 
of the German states. While the particulars of each organization, such as obligatory membership 
and the terms upon which bonds were issued and members held liable, varied depending on the 
credit association being discussed, each sought to enlarge its members’ access to credit while 
ensuring repayment and profitability for the association as a whole. From both the borrower and 
lender’s point of view, the business done by the various types of credit associations was 
“eminently satisfactory.”9 Borrowers found they had increased access to credit, and lenders 
typically found high repayment rates and a general low default risk.  
                                                          
7
 D.M. Frederiksen. “Mortgage Banking in Germany.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Oct., 
1994), 47. 
8
 Fredericksen., 51.  
9
 Ibid.,  57.  
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 The mortgage associations of the mid-eighteenth century thus formed a vital link 
between the borrowing and lending classes. They helped create a class of investors that “would 
in America be afraid of investing their savings in mortgages” but could do so in Germany by 
taking advantage of the high-quality bonds offered by these associations.10 By functioning as a 
viable alternative to traditional mortgage banks, these associations quickly transformed into a 
vital means of making a part of Germany’s real estate “current,” which is to say liquid and usable 
for economic activity.11 Above all, mutual credit associations for the landed class proved that 
safe bonds could be locally issued based on land. This was a pivotal first step in paving the way 
for a broader expansion of credit associations for Germany’s landless workers. 
 
The 1848 Revolution  
Further impetus for the expansion of cooperative associations occurred after the failed 
revolutions of 1848, when many German progressives turned to non-political means to help 
address the cries for social reform articulated by the poverty-stricken working class. The 1848 
revolutions, a string of political upheavals that swept through much of Europe, arose from a wide 
variety of causes dependent as much on local context as from the development of coherent 
ideological movements. Broadly however, the numerous debates that had been taking place in 
European society prior to 1848 were important factors. Liberal reformers and more radical 
thinkers were busy trying to reshape national governments. Meanwhile, technological 
innovations were revolutionizing the life of the working class and an increasingly free press was 
extending political awareness and disseminating important new ideas such as liberalism, 
nationalism, and socialism. Alexis Toqueville, in his book Recollections, aptly characterized the 
                                                          
10
 Ibid., 56-7. 
11
 Fredericksen, Mortgage Banking, 60. 
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fractured socioeconomic situation when he described European society as cut in two: “those who 
had nothing united in common envy, and those who had anything united in common terror.”12  
These new ideas helped inform the revolutionary movement in Germany, where demands 
for unification, a constitutional regime, a free press, and an unlimited right to political 
association intermingled with the call for social and economic reform. The social aspect of 
Germany’s revolutionary movement, termed by one scholar as the ‘primal revolution,’ was the 
part of the revolution most instrumental in inspiring later German progressives to create 
economic institutions to help the poor. According to the historian Dieter Dowe, in the primal 
revolution, the “actions, demands, and aspirations of the [lower-class] population [were] central 
to the revolution,” and socioeconomic concerns dominated over political aims.13  
These social and economic concerns have been called the social question by later 
historians, and in Regulating the Social, George Steinmetz aptly defines their scope. Steinmetz 
refers to the ‘social’ as the space between the economy and the state, and he defines Germany’s 
social sphere as “an arena of collective needs, grievances, and disruptions that were related to the 
transformations in the economic realm.” Steinmetz further suggests that, “insofar as the social 
represented a threat to order—the order of the state and the capitalist economy—it posed the 
“social question, or rather a series of social questions.”14  
Frieda Wunderlich argues in Farm Labor in Germany 1810-1945, that the gradual 
abolishment of feudalism in the countryside was a major contributing factor in the drive for 
economic reform which lay at the heart of the social question. Wunderlich believes that as 
feudalism’s patriarchal relationships disintegrated, the rural laborer became more independent 
                                                          
12
 Alexis Toqueville. Recollections: The French Revolution of 1848 (Garden City, NY, Doubleday, 1970), 98.  
13
 Dieter Dowe and others, eds, Europe in 1848, Revolution and Reform (New York: Berghahn Books, 2001), 12. 
14
 George Steinmetz, Regulating the Social: The Welfare State and Local Politics in Imperial Germany (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1993), 2. 
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but less able to achieve economic viability.15 Legally free but suffering from a shortage of credit, 
agricultural workers were unable to make the improvements in their land necessary for economic 
survival in an environment in which globalization and industrialization posed serious challenges 
to traditional agricultural production. Aside from the dissolution of agrarian feudalism, issues of 
economic reform also gained prominence because of the rise of mass poverty in Germany in the 
pre-March period.  
Many recent historians have argued that the basic reason for this increase in mass poverty 
was the so-called ‘demographic revolution’ that took place in the first half of the nineteenth 
century. In Prussia, for example, the population increased from 10.3 million to 19.5 million 
between 1815 and 1865.16 The structural crisis produced by the population explosion 
exacerbated problems of falling agricultural prices, rising unemployment, poor wage conditions, 
famine, and a series of economic crises between 1846 and 1848 to increase demands for an 
alternate pattern of distribution among the lower classes.17 
Yet as the push for economic reform continued, the traditional ruling elite and elements 
of the middle class began to fear the disruptive potential of the social question. Liberal 
arguments for social freedom and a market economy were therefore increasingly tempered by an 
acknowledgement that solving Germany’s pauperism required new institutions which could 
effectively address modern economic realities within the existing state structure. Still, despite the 
ultimate failure of the political revolution, German progressives continued to express many of 
the ideals that inspired the revolution. These included an increased concern for material interests 
                                                          
15
 Frieda Wunderlich, Farm Labor in Germany, 1810-1945 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961), 18. 
16
 Wolfgang Schwentker. “Victor Aimé Huber and Emergence of Social Conservatism.” in Between Reform, 
Reaction, and Resistance: Studies in the History of German Conservatism from 1789 to 1945, edited by Larry Jones 
and James N. Retallack (Oxford: Berg Publishers Inc, 1993), 99. 
17
 Michael Prinz, “Consumer co-operatives’ History with Politics Left In: The German Case,” 368. See also 
Schwentker., 100. The causes of German poverty tended to be structural and permanent during this time. 
Explosive demographic growth and the impact of industrialization on the value of labor both lowered wages, while 
surplus agricultural produce collapsed food prices and lowered agrarian incomes.  
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and spiritual preservation, tempered faith in the free market, a reliance on the state for preserving 
order, confidence in social progress, and finally, anxiety about what this social change would 
mean for the traditional social fabric.18 It is in this ongoing conflict to define liberal interests and 
to foster social harmony that cooperative organizations emerged as a new way to achieve social 
and economic reform within a (relatively) free economy and a traditional state. 
 
The German Cooperative Movement 
The development of the Raiffeisen credit cooperatives arose in this decidedly post-
revolutionary context. German concern for the traditional order in light of cultural modernism, 
the perceived danger of socialist revolutions, and the consequences of urbanization and 
industrialization had all led to a growing awareness among the ruling and middle classes of a 
need to regulate political, economic, and cultural practices. Baron Vom Stein, a progressive 
Prussian nobleman, found the thought of further revolution abominable. To avoid it, he believed 
in the creation of healthy rural and urban working conditions. The Baron wrote, “Organizations 
for mutual support must be formed, and those sharing in the work should also share in the profit 
of capital.” Then and only then, “out of a spirit of self-help and fraternity, from the dignity of 
work and the cooperation of workers at all levels” could a “citizens-state of Germany” arise that 
would be able to breed a satisfied people.”19  
One impulse the co-operative movement sought then, was to resolve the dispute between 
capital and labor, between the large landowner and the impoverished farmer, the artisan and the 
industrialist. As Hermann Schulze-Delitzsch, the founder of the first urban cooperative 
movement in Germany, stated, the establishment of peace between these two antagonist forces of 
                                                          
18
 Sheehan., 91-2. 
19
 Sheehan., 33. 
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society could be bridged only by blending their long-opposing interests, or by making “the 
working-man his own capitalist.”20 For Schulze-Delitzsch, the poor had no credit because he was 
destitute, and he continued to be destitute because he had no credit. Schulze-Delitzsch believed 
that the domination of the ‘profit motive’ (or the primacy of individual interests) in society was 
leading to a dangerous and inequitable distribution of wealth and income.  
Without extending economic opportunity and creating some measure of equality, this 
recurring strife between capital and labor would continue to create upheaval between two 
“necessarily antagonist forces with different interests, different aims, and different aspirations.”21 
For Schulze-Delitzsch and other liberal thinkers, the possessing class and the lower class were 
divided into two belligerent parties between whom peace would only be established from time to 
time until a measure of economic equality was finally achieved. In order to break this cycle, the 
provision of credit to the poor was required. To do this, one needed only to create a moral and 
social guarantee that was as secure as collateral.22 The economic innovations of credit 
cooperatives thus lie in their ability to use social capital to overcome asymmetric information 
and repayment issues. 
 
The Raiffeisen Credit Associations 
 Friedrich Raiffeisen was less overtly political than Schulze-Delitzsch. Like his urban 
counterpart, however, Raiffeisen also sought to “capitalize honesty” and to encourage thrift, 
industriousness, sobriety, and honest among cooperative members in order to improve their 
material conditions and counter “moral decay.”23 Raiffeisen’s emphasis on morality and 
                                                          
20
 Wolff., 2.  
21
 Wolff., 2. 
22
 Wolff., 18. 
23
 Wolff., 4. 
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traditional values, developed in his childhood and honed during his career as a rural mayor, 
underscored his view that economic institutions depended on their social context and vice versa. 
Thus when Raiffeisen wrote that, “Moral forces based on Christian principles are indispensable 
in order to solve social problems,” and “the affectionate concern of the possessing classes for the 
poorer ones, through the ties offered by this type of cooperative society, is the only way to form 
the proper guild of the future” he is arguing that economic prosperity for the lower classes can 
only be achieved by utilizing traditional social institutions and relationships  to strengthen the 
financial mechanisms of his cooperative institution.24    
Ultimately, Raiffeisen believed that through credit cooperatives, needy peasants could 
acquire and improve upon their land, “thereby reducing the proletariat, enlarging the size and 
raising the value of real estate, and increasing extraordinarily agricultural production.”25 In 
common with Schulze-Delitzsch but originating from a more moral and conservative 
perspective, Raiffeisen believed that only through the extension of credit to the rural peasantry 
could economic prosperity be assured.26  
 
The Rural Context in Germany 
Raiffeisen’s focus on providing credit for strictly agricultural areas was obviously 
influenced by the realities he confronted as a rural mayor. Robert Moeller argues in his book, 
                                                          
24
 Raiffeisen., 39. Raiffeisen cooperatives, particularly in their early stages, were almost always organized on Parish 
lines. They often also had the local priest involved on the management committee. This was the case with the 
Heddesdorf cooperative. For a further development of this argument see Helmut Walser Smith’s, German 
Nationalism and Religious Conflict: Culture, Ideology, Politics, 1870-1914 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1995), 79-92. Smith argues that religion, like class, was a central category defining Germans. He then goes on to 
argue that secularization followed an essentially linear path in Germany, in which society transitioned from an 
agrarian world ordered by religion to a “differentiated, industrial society emancipated from religious belief.” Thus 
Smith argues that, “Political views were often articulated in religious language, conservative political mobilization 
remained a largely Protestant domain [in Prussia], and religious allegiances influenced responses to social problems. 
25
 Raiffeisen., 23. 
26
 Fairbairn. “History from the Ecological Perspective,” 1217, 1220. 
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German Peasants and Agrarian Politics, that economic concerns dominated the interests of 
peasant farmers more than other sectors of society. He states: 
“The borders between the structure of economic enterprise and the family are unclear when 
family members constitute the farm’s labor force and when co-workers, related by blood, share a 
common table and residence. The family farm is at once the site of production and of 
consumption, both the workplace and home. The economic decision to expand livestock herds or 
to introduce a new crop rotation, for example, has an immediate impact on familial relations; 
new patterns of production mean a renegotiated division of labor within their family.”27 
 
So, not only did the Raiffeisen union transcend the economic sphere by virtue of the relationship 
between economic enterprise and family in agricultural regions, but the Raiffeisen cooperatives 
were also unique in their focus on providing long-term agricultural credit. This focus had its 
roots in the process of peasant emancipation and the problems it had created for the small farmer, 
who, “must now buy his tools, manure, and seeds,” in order to “cultivate to advantage the land 
which we are, most of us, at any rate professedly willing to place in his possession.”28 The 
importance of providing credit at affordable interest rates was, in turn, vital for the “successful 
adaptation and integration of peasant producers into a capitalist economy.”29 Without long-term 
credit, the farmer would not be able to repay his debts or make the necessary improvements to 
his land or capital that would allow him to join the middle class.  
Improvements in the agricultural economy tend to involve either material improvements 
or improvements in the institutional and agrarian structure. For example, physical changes might 
involve the mechanization of certain processes, while an institutional change could be changing 
the source of credit from a private moneylender to rural credit cooperative.30 The relationship 
between the two is an interdependent one. Ungku Aziz argues in “Cooperation as a Method to 
                                                          
27
 Robert Moeller, German Peasants and Agrarian Politics, 1914-1924: The Rhineland and Westphalia (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986), 5. 
28
 Wolff., 66.  
29
 Moeller., 32. 
30
 Ungku A. Aziz. “Cooperation as a Method to Increase Agricultural Productivity.” In The Role of Cooperation in 
Social and Economic Development (New York: Asia Publishing House, 1966), 19. 
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Increase Agricultural Productivity,” that Germany’s large imbalance between income levels of 
farms on the one side, and the landed or mercantile class on the other, made cooperative loans 
even more desirable. This is because the Raiffeisen loan structure, which was designed to 
increase the productivity of a farmer’s resources, helped poor farmers avoid going into a state of 
indebtedness “that might mean the loss of land, livestock, or tools.”31 Without these 
improvements, small and lower middle-class groups of farmers would be unable to exist within a 
context that increasingly demanded large-scale production.  
Nothing short of Germany’s future hung in the balance. Raiffeisen wrote, “The well-
being of the entire society and also of the State depends on the solid status of the rural, mainly 
agricultural sector of the population. The question of how to bring about the necessary help is 
one of the most urgent problems of our day, if not the most important aim of social reform.”32 
The economic and social spheres were thus irrevocably intertwined in agrarian Germany, and the 
formation of an organization that could address the material realities of peasant life and help to 
integrate peasants into a capitalist economy had to combine social and economic aspects into one 
institution.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
31
 Aziz., 21. 
32
 Raiffeisen., 33. 
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Cooperatives as Economic Institutions  
Turning from the social and historical context in which Raiffeisen cooperatives 
developed, we can now examine their operation as an economic institution. Although they are 
often overshadowed by Germany’s universal banks, credit cooperatives were vital in providing 
financial access to Germany’s working class. Their successful approach is echoed by their 
explosive growth. By 1908 for example, Raiffeisen cooperatives counted over 400,000 members 
in over 4,000 separate societies. Collectively, cooperative institutions had deposits of over four 
hundred million marks representing nearly 6.8 percent of Germany’s financial assets.33 Although 
still a small percentage of Germany’s total banking assets, cooperatives were very influential. 
The Raiffeisen union director in 1908 for example, estimated that cooperatives were responsible 
for a full one percent reduction in the interest rate and thus the cheapening of credit to that 
extent.34 Other economists estimate that the impact of cooperatives was even more pronounced 
within their respective geographic area, lowering interest rates as much as 10-15 percent for local 
members.35 As vital as the social and ideological precepts of cooperatives were for promoting 
their development, it was truly the cooperatives’ ability to out-compete other financial 
institutions in serving “the urban artisans and rural smallholders that formed the basis of [their] 
membership” that fueled their sustained growth. 36 
In their development, credit cooperatives had four principle competitors: the large central 
Kreditbanken on which so much research is focused, the Sparkassen or savings banks, the 
Privatbanken (private banks), and local moneylenders. Each of these financial systems had 
                                                          
33
 Timothy W. Guinnane. “Cooperatives As Information Machines: German Rural Credit Cooperatives, 1883-1914.” 
The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 61, No. 2 (June 2002), 368. 
34
 Henry W. Wolff People’s Banks: A Record of Social and Economic Success (London: P.S. King and Son, 1910), 
143, 147. 
35
 Guinnane, “Cooperatives As Information Machines: German Rural Credit Cooperatives, 1883-1914,” 368. 
36
 Guinnane, Germany’s Banking System, 90. 
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different structures and goals, which led the four types of banks to be distinguished by their 
different “assets and liabilities, ownership, legal status and limitations, and clientele.”37 The 
Sparkassen for example, were an attempt to provide a “safe place for urban poor and middle-
class people to deposit their savings” in order to earn interest on their deposits. 38 As such, they 
were conservative in their asset composition, focusing mostly on real estate and government 
paper. The private banks, which developed in the late 18th century, were primarily a means to 
finance trade and government debt, offering both loans and investment-banking services. 
Germany’s universal credit banks on the other hand, were a larger more capitalized form of the 
private banks that offered a broader range of services. Together the Privatbanken and the 
Kreditbanken stimulated Germany’s economic development by providing lending services 
targeted for industrial and commercial purposes.39  
Credit cooperatives, the Sparkassen, and moneylenders were all more concerned with 
extending the range of financial services for individual members of society than the larger banks. 
Cooperatives in particular, were geared towards providing loans to the poor in order to foster 
their economic emancipation. In part because of their competition with other types of banks, 
however, cooperatives were not only active in extending loans but engaged in many of the 
deposit services that Sparkassen did. Members could conveniently deposit their savings with the 
cooperative and would expect to receive moderate interest payments on these deposits. These 
deposits were time deposits, meaning the members received the deposits plus interest upon the 
expiration of the specified time. In order to withdraw their money, members typically had to give 
                                                          
37
 Guinnane. “Delegated Monitors,” 81. 
38
 Guinnane. “Delegated Monitors,” 84. 
39
 The summary of the various types of German banks in the latter half of the 19th century is provided by Timothy 
Guinnane, in his article, “Germany’s Banking System, 1800-1914” and also in “Cooperatives as Information 
Machines.” Along with a descriptive overview of the banks, Guinnane also provides a useful table on page 81 of 
“Delegated Monitors” which breaks down Germany’s financial institutions by percentage of total assets from 1860 
to 1913..  
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a three month withdrawal notice. From the cooperatives’ point of view, these deposits, which 
came from both members and nonmembers alike, constituted their primary liabilities, and were 
used as capital for the lending side of the business. Given the long loans typically extended by 
the Raiffeisen cooperatives and the shorter-term nature of these deposits, this meant that rural 
cooperatives were often lending long and borrowing short.40  
The cooperatives’ success in lending to a “difficult clientele” was a result of their 
structural advantages over the other banking institutions and their foundation as a self-help 
savings mobilization movement. Both of these factors enabled them to extend cheap credit with 
minimal risk of default.41 Timothy Guinnane, the author of an extensive series of articles 
exploring the operation of Raiffeisen credit cooperatives, suggests three principle ways in which 
the cooperatives were better able to overcome asymmetric information and loan enforcement 
issues than conventional banks.  
The first view emphasizes the role of the community in “sustaining non-opportunistic 
behavior among participants.”42 Here, the presence of social ties not available to more traditional 
banks greatly strengthened the ability of the cooperative to impose effective low-cost sanctions 
on defaulters. The second view is a game theory approach in which the cooperative is sustained 
by repeated interactions. This view stresses how the combination of a restricted geographic area 
of operation and repeated interactions between members allowed cooperatives to gain better 
information about borrowers over time. The importance of remaining a member of the 
cooperative for both social status and future access to credit also provided an incentive for 
                                                          
40
 Guinnae. “Delegated Monitors,” 90. 
41
 Guinnane, Germany’s Banking System, 82. 
42
 Abhijit Banerjee, Timothy Besley, and Timothy Guinnnane. “Thy Neighbor’s Keeper: The Design of A  
Credit Cooperative with Theory and a Test.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 109, No. 2 (May., 1994), 
491. 
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members to curtail “private optimal, shortsighted behavior” for the good of the collective.43 
Because Guinnane believes both of the first two views depend on “durable long-term relations” 
among either individual members or between members and the institution, he calls this argument 
for cooperative efficiency the long-term interaction view of credit cooperatives.44 
The third view for why cooperatives were successful depends on the argument that 
cooperatives were more efficient than other banks in screening and monitoring borrowers. This 
efficiency advantage has been called by Guinnane and others the peer monitoring view. Here, 
neighbors are assumed to have better information about borrowers than banks, and the challenge 
for cooperatives is to structure themselves in such a way that members have an incentive to 
monitor one another. Guinnane argues that Raiffeisen cooperatives imbedded these incentives 
within three constitutional provisions: (1) joint liability, or the process by which some or all of 
the other members of the cooperative may be made liable for any loan on which the cooperative 
defaults; (2) the use of cosigners to secure individual loans, and (3) the use of dividends to create 
incentives for the profitable repayment of loans.45 Both the long-term interaction and peer 
monitoring viewpoints suggest ways in which credit cooperatives could function more efficiently 
than traditional banks in providing services to its members. They also yield important insights 
into how a credit association should structure itself regarding liability, financing, interest, scope 
of operations, and day-to-day business.  
In banking terminology, a bank’s services to its investors is usually called ‘delegated 
monitoring,’ and consists of screening borrowers, monitoring their conduct, auditing their ability 
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to repay loans, and enforcing the terms of loan contracts.46 According to Guinnane (2002), how a 
bank functions as a delegated monitor, or financial intermediary, depends on two types of 
information problems. The first concerns the informational asymmetry between a banker and the 
bank’s depositors. Since a banker inherently knows more about the projects a bank has funded, 
he could theoretically take advantage of depositors for self-profit. Cooperatives avoided this 
problem altogether by utilizing a “bottom up” approach, in which members owned and 
controlled the organization. Each individual cooperative decided who could become a member, 
and all members could participate on “an equal basis in elections for management positions and 
on the important policy issues put to a general vote.”47 By giving each member the incentive to 
act honestly, the cooperative structure thus minimized the first form of informational asymmetry.  
The second information problem focuses on how a bank acts as a delegated monitor. Questions 
about how the organization should be designed, who to lend to, how to structure loans, and what 
other kinds of terms it requires to secure loans all arise in addressing how the Raiffeisen 
cooperatives provided their financial services.48 The way in which the Heddesdorf cooperative 
addressed this second information question forms the basis for my research. 
Many economic historians for example, argue that loan organization casts light on an 
institution’s informational shortcomings. Thus the way a bank structures a loan is an important 
signal about what information it lacks. Collateral, short-term loans, and cosigners were all 
mechanisms banks used to try and ensure repayment or filter out those applicants to whom 
extending a loan would be undesirable. According to Guinnane (2001), the loan policies of rural 
German credit associations showed that information and enforcement were not serious problems. 
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First, the Raiffeisen cooperatives all made long term loans. In fact, in 1870 only 10 percent of 
loans had a repayment period less than one year while nearly 60 percent had a repayment period 
of one to five years. By 1901 this percentage had grown still further; 21 percent of all 
outstanding loans from Raiffeisen credit cooperatives had a term of ten or more years and 
another 70 percent had a term of one to ten years.49  
As we have argued, these long term loans were largely a response to the seasonality and 
variability of agricultural industry. The German academic, Theodor Kraus, for example, argued 
that agriculturalists needed credit for longer periods than the urban workers and small 
businessmen in order to make the investments needed to make their land productive and to 
bridge the gap between harvest cycles.50 The ability of Raiffeisen cooperatives to extend long-
term loans while safeguarding member deposits was widely recognized. During two great wars, 
in both 1866 and 1870, when individuals were removing deposits from other banks en masse, 
“deposits were actually pressed upon the Raiffeisen Banks for safe keeping, though it should be 
without any interest at all.”51 
Credit cooperatives also allowed individuals as cosigners that would not be acceptable to 
other formal lenders. Cosigners for a cooperative-approved loan could have relatively few assets 
of their own to pledge against the loan or even have borrowed large amounts of their own. Many 
times these cosigners were even related to the debtor! Guinnane (2001) argues that the 
acceptance of nearly all cosigners, regardless of wealth or social status, meant that the 
cooperative had a great deal of information about the people securing loans and were thus less 
worried about overall loan security. This implies that rural cooperatives depended on the “dense 
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economic and noneconomic relationships” between members to lower the cost of sorting out 
risks and to “keep an eye on borrowers once loans were taken.”52 
 The Raiffeisen unions were able to depend on this social web, at least in part because of 
their small size and local organization. By intentionally restricting their operations to a small 
geographic area and a small number of people, actual and potential members of a cooperative 
would “enjoy considerable knowledge of each other’s habits, character, and abilities.”53 In 1913, 
the Raiffeisen cooperatives reported that 80 percent of its cooperatives operated in areas with 
fewer than 3,000 inhabitants. In effect, members screened potential borrowers and monitored 
those who had loans extended to them because they were part of the same intimate community. 
As Guinnane puts it, “peasant nosiness forms the basis of the efficiency hypothesis.”54 
Geographic restriction also allowed cooperatives to impose economic sanctions or extra-
economic (social) sanctions on defaulters at a low cost. Because cooperatives were locally based, 
expelled members no longer had access to any cooperative credit and had to avail themselves to 
the much less favorable loan terms provided by moneylenders and large banks. Ex-members also 
faced the costly public knowledge of their dismissal from the cooperative. In a historical context 
in which the village remained the primary social unit, ostracism and public disgrace provided a 
powerful incentive for repaying one’s loans. Such a dismissal may also have limited further 
opportunities for conducting business in the area. The effectiveness of such penalties was, in 
turn, vital because the small size of most cooperative loans precluded more expensive monitoring 
and sanctioning. In fact, Guinnane argues that the small loan amounts sought out by most 
borrowers was only possible because of the low-cost of information about members. Local 
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membership thus limited the risk of adverse selection and imperfect enforcement that are 
common to all financial institutions. 
While their small size and limited area conveyed certain advantages, it also meant that 
credit associations faced severe forms of the liquidity and confidence problems that beset any 
financial institution. In an effort to mitigate this problem, different associations developed supra-
local structures. Centrals, or Centralkassen, were a form of regional cooperative bank that 
accepted surplus deposits from and made loans to local cooperatives (as well as to other financial 
institutions and to the capital market at large).55 For individual cooperatives, membership to a 
Central helped convince the public that the ill-liquid financing of “long-term loans out of short-
term deposits” did not threaten solvency.56 Each individual cooperative, particularly in rural 
areas where members relied on similar economic activities, could benefit from membership in a 
regional association because they guaranteed access to liquidity and smoothed seasonal 
fluctuations in loan demands and withdrawals. In addition, centrals gave cooperatives with more 
deposits than loans a safe place to invest their money, provided bridge loans to struggling 
cooperatives, and ensured sufficient start-up capital for some incipient associations.57 To 
summarize, centrals helped mitigate credit associations’ regional weaknesses, permitting them to 
utilize the local ties needed to successfully target borrowers without collateral.    
In addition to centrals, most cooperatives also belonged to an auditing association. By 
examining the cooperatives’ business practices and recordkeeping, these associations insured 
that the public could expect certain rules to be adhered to. Auditors often also provided the 
cooperatives’ treasurer with instruction and technical assistance in order to minimize future 
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information errors.58 This was particularly vital since most cooperatives relied on local 
management whose banking prowess was often distrusted by outsiders. A successful audit, 
signaled to potential members and depositors that a cooperative was well-run.59 Different 
cooperatives utilized auditing associations very differently however. Schulze-Delitzsch 
cooperatives recommended periodic audits but successfully resisted compulsory audits on the 
basis that such a practice might create a moral hazard issue where the auditing was seen to 
substitute for internal vigilance.60 Raiffeisen cooperatives, however, mandated audits at least 
every other year, believing this to be an indispensable way to foster trust in individual 
cooperatives.  
The different use of auditing associations between the Raiffeisen and Schulze-Delitzsch 
organizations underscores some of the major differences between rural and urban cooperatives. 
The most obvious difference is in their loan policies. Whereas the Schulze-Delitzsch 
cooperatives extended short-term loans, typically  lasting only three months, the Raiffeisen 
organizations concentrated on long term loans, most of which ranged from one to five years. 
This difference, resulting from the unique credit needs of agriculturalists, reflects the more 
restricted membership and intimate social nature of Raiffeisen cooperatives.  Guinnane argues 
that because the Schulze-Delitzsch cooperatives operated in urban areas, “where members might 
have little contact with one another and have less, if any, of the dense economic and 
noneconomic relationships that characterized the membership of the rural cooperatives,” their 
lending practices more closely resembled those of traditional banks.61  
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Schulze-Delitzsch cooperatives thus had larger membership fees, instituted valuable 
shares to raise capital, discouraged the very poor from joining, and paid larger dividends to 
members in order to attract deposits and maintain the advantages of membership than did rural 
cooperatives. Raiffeisen cooperatives, on the other hand, had only nominal or small shares and 
relied on deposits for capital. The Schulze-Delitzsch organizations also embraced limited 
liability for their members far more rapidly than the Raiffeisen organizations following the 1889 
cooperative law.62 Overall, these differences only strengthen the argument that Raiffeisen 
cooperatives had an efficiency advantage over more traditional banks when extending loans.  
The rural and often isolated location of Raiffeisen cooperatives also made them attractive 
as savings institutions for members who were not seeking loans.63 Guinnane (2001) argues that 
these non-borrowing members were vital for the functioning of the cooperative for several 
reasons. First, membership implied liability for the cooperatives’ loans, meaning non-borrowers 
were important for monitoring how deposits were used, having every incentive to “report the 
unwise use of credit.”64 Effectively, these members helped prevent collusive arrangements 
among borrowing members, which prevented the first type of informational asymmetry from 
developing. Second, non-borrowers often acted as cosigners on the loans of others. Guinnane 
contends that in this capacity non-borrowing members could screen individual borrowers and 
“function as a delegated monitor once a loan has been made.” 65 Finally, the social and economic 
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relationship between a cosigner and borrower also gave borrowers better incentives to “work 
hard and to use safe production methods.”66  
The role of non-borrowing members highlights the importance of the interaction between 
the Raiffeisen cooperatives’ economic mission and its social and ideological underpinnings. 
Raiffeisen’s notions of community self-help, Christian values of neighborly concern, and the 
mutual dependence of one’s income on the fortunes of the greater community for example, all 
fostered the widespread involvement in the cooperative necessary for its success in overcoming 
information and enforcement issues. Guinnane concludes that because of their ability to 
“capitalize on superior information and to impose inexpensive but effective sanctions on 
defaulters,” cooperative banking arrangements were superior in providing “liquidity and 
payment services, risk management, and information processing”  for the traditionally 
underserved.67 Ultimately, cooperative lending policy was different because of their ability to tap 
into social capital, and the cooperative organization and method of doing business reflected this 
difference.  
 But are the theoretical arguments for cooperative efficiency reflected in the actual 
operation of rural credit cooperatives? Turning to the Heddesdorf cooperative, we can now test 
the long-term interaction and peer monitoring arguments advanced by Timothy Guinnane. The 
data allow us to compare five independent yet related hypotheses. They are that:  
(1)   Social ties lowered the risks of asymmetric information 
(2)  Repeated transactions lowered the risk of asymmetric information and 
provided an incentive for loan repayment 
(3)   Monitoring was efficient and effective in reducing adverse selection  
(4)   Social networks and geographic restriction created effective sanctions for 
nonpayment  
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(5)   The cooperative benefited from low transaction costs through voluntary labor, 
local monitoring, and the pressure social relationships created for debt 
repayment 
 
The Heddesdorf Credit Cooperative 
In testing the above hypotheses, this paper uses the organization and transaction records 
of the Heddesdorf credit cooperative between 1869 and 1884. The Heddesdorf credit 
cooperative, located in the small rural town of Heddesdorf along the Rhine in the southwest of 
Prussia, was the first cooperative founded by Friedrich Raiffeisen. According to its statutes, the 
cooperative was founded for “the purpose of putting members into a position to enjoy the fruits 
of their labor and achieve the utmost independence through the advancement of credits 
which…will protect members against poverty and its detrimental consequences.”68  
The business records of the Heddesdorf cooperative detail the organizational structure of 
the cooperative as well as every loan transaction they engaged in. These listed transactions 
record the name of the creditor, the name of the co-signer(s) securing the loan, the loan amount, 
the duration of the loan, the geographic location of the cosigner (if it was different than 
Heddesdorf), and sometimes, the original purpose of the loan. Despite their richness, the 
Heddesdorf records are far from perfect. The biggest difficulty in working with them is that they 
are sometimes incomplete, especially in the earlier years. Furthermore, the data they contain is 
not suitable for more rigorous quantitative analysis, but is more descriptive in nature.  
Nevertheless, the records do provide a glimpse into how Raiffeisen credit cooperatives 
functioned. The case study is laid out in three sections: it begins with the organizational structure 
of the Heddesdorf cooperative, follows with general data concerning the overall growth in the 
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cooperatives’ operation, and ends with examining the loan transaction data in comparison with 
the hypotheses advanced above. As will be shown, the structure and operation of the Heddesdorf 
cooperative provides qualified support for all five of the ‘testable hypotheses’ articulated above, 
lending credence to the argument that the Raiffeisen cooperatives succeeded because of their 
ability to capitalize on superior information and effective low-cost enforcement when providing 
long-term loans. 
 
Organizational Structure 
The Heddesdorf Cooperative had two managerial bodies. First, there was the Vorstand, or 
management committee, which consisted of one director and at least four other members. 
According to Raiffeisen, the Vorstand, “represents the cooperative society legally as well as 
extrajudicially and administers its business conforming to the legal and statutory regulations.”69 
Elected for two year terms, the management committee made most of the important decisions at 
their monthly meetings such as accepting new members, granting loans, controlling accounts 
with the Centrals, and so on. Next there was the supervising committee, or Aufsichtstrat, which 
consisted of at least twelve members serving on staggered two year terms. The Aufsichtstrat met 
quarterly and its primary task was to oversee the Vorstand, essentially functioning as a sort of 
internal auditor by reviewing and approving the management committee’s decisions. On some 
important matters, such as extending very large loans or approving a loan to a Vorstand member, 
the supervising committee actually had first say. Finally there was the membership as a whole, 
the Generalversammlung, which met at least annually to elect the previous two committees and 
review the cooperatives’ operation. The general membership also decided on basic policies, such 
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as setting the interest rate on both loans and deposits.70 According to Raiffeisen, “the general 
assembly was sovereign,” the place where all members could exercise their rights within the 
society.71  
This three tiered system, common to all Raiffeisen cooperatives, helped to create a 
system of checks and balances to align individual interests with those of the broader 
membership. Because members were simultaneously the cooperatives’ depositors and its 
management, responsible for the business operations of the cooperative, the first informational 
asymmetry between depositors and management simply did not exist.72 And aside from the 
efficiency advantage achieved by this democratic organizational structure, the Heddesdorf 
committees were also effective in lowering the transaction costs of conducting business, lending 
support for hypothesis five. This is because both the management and supervisory committees 
were comprised of members who did not receive payment. Thus substantial aspects of the 
cooperatives business were managed for little to no monetary costs. For example, the 
management committee decided on which loans to approve (and issued “the legally binding loan 
and deposit certificates” to borrowers and cosigners) on a monthly basis while also reviewing the 
cooperatives’ books at the end of every year, while the supervisory committee reviewed the 
guarantors of each outstanding loan on an annual basis, as well as performing general monitoring 
tasks to ensure that the general interests of the cooperative were being met.73  
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This is not to say that the cooperative depended on voluntary labor for its survival. In 
addition to the three committees, each cooperative also employed a treasurer. The treasurer was 
the single most important person in the cooperative, or as Raiffeisen put it, he was the “quasi-
soul of the Union.”74 The Heddesdorf treasurer served a four year term and was paid a salary 
determined by the general assembly.75 His responsibilities included tracking all deposits and 
loans, preparing promissory notes, compiling monthly and annual reports, and attending to many 
other day-to-day business matters. The voluntary nature of the treasurer’s labor within some 
credit cooperatives has caused a few economists to argue that this unpaid labor was critical to 
their survival.76 Guinnane (2001) finds, however, that even those credit associations that did pay 
their managers did not noticeably alter their loan rates.77 Thus, he argues that the vast majority of 
credit associations could have paid their managers without any substantive difference in their 
profitability and hence survivability. 
 
Membership 
While membership in the Heddesdorf cooperative was open, it was not guaranteed. The 
statutes limited membership to citizens in Heddesdorf that met with the approval of the 
administrative committee. Raiffeisen repeatedly indicates that this should be honest, thrifty, and 
hardworking folk.  Notably, women could become members, but they were denied voting 
rights.78 Once accepted, all members (except women) had an equal right to participation and 
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equal representation via voting rights. The geographic restriction placed on membership was 
vital to the operation of the cooperative. 
 First, the biannual meeting of the general assembly and the monthly meetings of the 
management committee were more convenient and lower cost for nearby members. These 
meetings and the voting process via absolute majority would simply not have been feasible in a 
larger and less confined organization.79 For the system to work well, however, members needed 
to take an active role in the cooperative. For Heddesdorf, this appears not to have been an issue. 
During the general assembly’s biannual meetings, members of the administrative committee who 
were not in attendance (without a sufficient excuse) were fined two silbergroschen. This money 
was then used to buy drinks for everyone at the meeting, underscoring the close and intimate 
nature of the cooperative. Aside from turning individual absences into cause for celebration, this 
system probably also helped insure adequate participation and involvement of the committee 
members. 
Of far more importance, however, was the need for members to know one another, both 
for aspects of the day-to-day operation of the cooperative and because members were jointly 
liable for one another’s debt. Raiffeisen believed that restricted membership was essential to 
improving the material standing of members. He wrote, “Because of their small size, constant 
communication with each other, common interests and going to church together, connections 
between relatives and friends, the residents [of a Parish] have very detailed knowledge of each 
others’ family and monetary conditions.”80 Overall, geographic restriction created a web of 
social relationships between members, lending support to hypotheses one and three, which argue 
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that social relationships lowered information asymmetries and created effective monitoring 
mechanisms.81  
The initial composition of the Heddesdorf management committee demonstrates how 
these traditional social relationships lowered the risk and cost of issuing loans. Aside from 
Raiffeisen, the other original members consisted of “Lehrer Lauf, Pfarrer Kauffmann, 
Gerichtsschöffe Ph. Siemeister and Gerichtsschöffe Wilhelm Hof.”82 Thus the original members 
of the Heddesdorf cooperative management committee consisted of the local mayor, a teacher, a 
priest, and two municipal magistrates. The use of a priest, teacher, and local politicians to 
organize cooperative efforts was a structure incorporated by many later Raiffeisen associations.83   
Much of the impetus for this structure likely resulted precisely because people occupying 
these positions had the extensive social contacts necessary to effectively screen potential 
members and review each loan application. Having members with extensive personal 
relationships within the community serve on the management committee therefore provided a 
low-cost method to assess the suitability of potential borrowers and monitor the repayment of 
already existing loans because members could monitor borrowers as “part of their daily 
activities.”84 The argument for local membership and social relationships as a cornerstone of the 
efficiency hypothesis is only strengthened in the subsequent section examining the actual pattern 
of loan transactions. 
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Once approved by the committee, new members were required to pay a membership fee 
of twenty silbergroschen.85 This fee was payable in two rates. Members paid the first half up 
front, and the second half could be paid over the following months. An additional capital 
contribution of twenty thalers was also required in order to join.86 Payments of these 
contributions were to be made on the first of every month in the amount of 5-10 silbergroschen 
until the total was reached. These capital contributions were viewed as a credit from the 
individuals to the association.  Members were refunded these contributions and received 5 
percent interest upon it when they left the cooperative—provided they had fulfilled all their 
obligations beforehand. The membership fee, on the other hand, was owned collectively by the 
organization and was used to capitalize the reserve fund, whose primary purpose was to protect 
the cooperative against any losses.  
For the Heddesdorf cooperative (and unlike their urban counterparts), the value of this fee 
was nominal. In fact, Raiffeisen was opposed to shares and the Raiffeisen union only adopted 
them following a court decision mandating their use.87 This opposition to large business shares, 
which originated partially because Raiffeisen wanted to include the very poor in the cooperative, 
is indicative of two things. First, that the Heddesdorf cooperative was not primarily concerned 
with capitalization issues, and second, that asymmetric information may not have been a serious 
issue. The first point is obvious; larger shares would have raised more capital faster (but 
prevented the very poor from becoming members). The second point, however, requires some 
explanation.  
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The Heddesdorf cooperative, like all early Raiffeisen cooperatives, operated with 
unlimited liability. All members were jointly liable for the full amount of the loans and 
obligations of the cooperative. A well-capitalized reserve fund was therefore critical to limiting 
the risk of membership by providing a guarantee against moderate losses. This was especially 
relevant for Heddesdorf because any member of the cooperative who had been a member for as 
short as three months and who had paid at least a quarter of their membership fee could be 
granted loans up to the maximum set by the board.88 But a conscious decision to allow the 
reserve fund to grow slowly may suggest that the cooperative was not overly concerned with 
loan losses arising because of a lack of informational asymmetries. So, because Heddesdorf had 
a great deal of information about borrowers and the status of its issued loans, membership was 
probably already considered safe, even with joint liability.   
Nevertheless, the Heddesdorf cooperative did establish a number of other provisions to 
ensure a stable reserve fund. In addition to the membership fees, at least 1/10th of any profit 
accrued by the cooperative would be added to the capital reserves. Significantly, no dividends 
were to be paid to members until the fund totaled at least 200 thalers.89 Finally, because the 
allotment of dividends from any leftover profit was split between members based on the amount 
of their deposits, the cooperative built in an incentive to raise the amount of these 
contributions.90 As shown in Figure 1, the Heddesdorf reserve fund saw a rapid and steady 
                                                          
88
 Raiffeisen Dokumente, Die Protokollbücher des Heddesdorfer Darlehnskassen Vereins 1864-1899, Statute 9. 
89
 Or approximately 67 marks. 
90
 In The People’s Banks of Germany: Their Organization Under the Recent Law, Herman Schulze-Delitzsch 
characterizes this incentive as “a most efficient spur to zeal” for raising the amount of these contributions, “because 
exactly the sharing in the dividends is regulated upon the amount paid in by individuals upon their respective 
business shares.” 
Sowers           34 
 
growth in total amount, averaging an annual increase of just under 800 marks between 1868 and 
1893.91   
 
Deposits and the Sparkasse 
The Heddesdorf cooperative was also engaged in taking in deposits—from both members 
and nonmembers alike. Raiffeisen believed that providing a safe place for rural farmers to save 
would encourage thrift. He stated, “The tendency to save must be incited, and the opportunity 
must be offered to invest the money earned by diligent work, not only safely, but also so it is 
bearing interest...[we] must accept as interest-yielding deposits idle sums of money.”92 
Raiffeisen’s focus on thrift suggests that other options for saving small amounts of money may 
have been scarce in rural Germany in the mid-nineteenth century. It is also likely that for some 
community members the transaction costs of traveling to a distant bank just to deposit limited 
savings outweighed any potential benefits they would accrue. 
Aside from encouraging saving in general, the Heddesdorf cooperative opened a 
Sparkasse in order to attract more capital. The cooperative enticed members to give deposits, 
with a minimum of 20 thalers and a maximum of 100, into the credit union in order to receive 
4.5 percent interest. Any additional deposits received a lower interest rate. In addition, members 
could use their deposits as credit contributions to the cooperative, with the opportunity to earn a 
3.5 percent interest rate for savers.93 Because nonmembers were also able to make deposits in the 
savings bank, the cooperative greatly expanded the potential capital base that served as the basis 
for its loan business. Finally, all deposits required a six month withdrawal notice, which allowed 
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the management committee to count on greater stability and information on the cooperative’s 
finances. Through the Sparkasse relatively safe, interest-bearing savings options with low 
payment levels were thus made available to the community.  
Figure 2 shows the deposit activity for the Sparkasse branch of the Heddesdorf 
cooperative. From 1877 until 1886, deposits almost tripled from 33618 marks to 85766 marks, 
an average increase of 5794 marks. This is followed by a plummeting of deposits back down to 
32535 marks by the end of 1887. After declining to below 20000 marks in 1890, the last four 
years of data show an average rise of 4031 marks back to 35569 marks at the close of 1894. The 
data does not indicate what caused the two drastic reductions in deposits between 1886-1887 and 
1888-1890 respectively. Nevertheless, the Sparkasse was obviously an important source of 
deposits for the Heddesdorf cooperative, and at no point in time did the Sparkasse deposits fall 
below the total amount of the reserve fund.   
In general, the deposit and saving side of the Heddesdorf cooperative was successful in 
attracting new capital. Figure 3 shows the growth of the cooperative’s total assets. From 1870 to 
1896 assets grew from just over 2000 marks to over 100,000 marks! This astonishing growth 
may be attributable to an external event not captured by the data, as the cooperative’s assets grew 
many tens of thousands of marks just between 1876 and 1877.94 It is unclear what caused this 
large jump, it may have been Imperial patronage following an 1875 royal commission or another 
factor altogether.95 Large fluctuations aside, however, the Heddesdorf union still saw its assets 
grow steadily in the other years. Between 1870 and 1876, total deposits more than doubled from 
2151 marks to 9628, increasing in all but one year. The average growth of deposits during this 
time was 738 marks per year. Between 1877 and 1896, the total amount of deposits held by the 
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cooperative was more varied, and year-to-year fluctuations do not trend strongly in either 
direction. Total deposits, however, never went below 69,150 marks and averaged 89,321 marks, 
while the long-term trend indicates that deposits were increasing over time.  
 The later records of the Heddesdorf cooperative seem to indicate an increasing 
sophistication in cooperative practice. First, the cooperative began keeping much better records 
tracking more variables such as the value of member shares, dividend payments, cash holdings, 
interest owed, outstanding debt, and court costs. Perhaps more importantly, however, the 
improving records offer a glimpse at the more varied aspects of the cooperative’s actual 
operation. For example, the records hint at Heddesdorf’s inclusion into the Raiffeisen central 
organization. Beginning in 1879, occurring again in 1880, 1881, and appearing scattered in the 
records thereafter, the cooperative was a net lender to the Central, extending 5,000, 14,150, and 
19,900 marks to the central respectively in each of these three years.96 At least for the limited 
data available, the Heddesdorf cooperative seems to have had a surplus of loanable assets which 
it was able to extend to the Central.  
The picture of overall growth and the cooperative’s ability to loan surplus deposits 
provides strong evidence that the deposit side of the Heddesdorf business was thriving. This 
argument is strengthened by looking at the net assets of the cooperative. Figure 4 shows the 
growth of these net assets between 1870 and 1896. Net assets show strong positive growth over 
the long-term, despite dramatic year-to-year fluctuations. Furthermore, in only one of these years 
did the Heddesdorf liabilities exceed its assets, indicating that there was enough confidence in 
the cooperative’s business to attract sufficient capital to offset its loan activity.  
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Credit and Loans 
Still, the main purpose of the Raiffeisen credit cooperatives was always to provide credit 
to their members, and the success of the Heddesdorf cooperative must be judged accordingly. As 
Figure 5 shows, the growth of the lending side of the Heddesdorf business follows a similar 
pattern to the deposit side. The total amount of loans extended grew from 2,151 marks in 1870 to 
over 87,000 by 1896.97 As with the deposit side, there is a radical increase in the amount of loans 
between 1876 and 1877, but again, except for this anomaly, the loans mimic the deposit pattern. 
The total loan amount shows a gradual increase between 1870 and 1876, increasing by 3,999 
marks overall, a yearly average increase of 667 marks. Following 1876, the amount of loans 
extended by the cooperative closely follow the deposit pattern; in all but two of the subsequent 
years, when the total amount of deposits increased the total amount of loans also increased and 
vice versa.  
Figure 6 plots assets and expenditures, or liabilities, together in order to show this 
relationship. Ultimately, the close trend between assets and liabilities indicates that the 
Heddesdorf cooperative was highly leveraged. This provides strong evidence for the first testable 
hypothesis, that cooperatives did not view asymmetric information as a serious issue. As 
Guinnane (2002) argues, “A conventional bank needs to maintain liquidity because it is one way 
to contend with the informational asymmetry between the bank’s managers and its depositors.” 
But because the Heddesdorf managers were also its depositors, the cooperative did not face this 
asymmetry to the same degree, and as a result “were able to have less liquid portfolios.”98  
The first asymmetric information hypothesis is strengthened by the distinction between 
the loans extended by the Heddesdorf cooperative and those given by both traditional banks and 
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urban credit cooperatives. First, most Heddesdorf loans were long-term, averaging 4.22 years.99 
Table 1 shows the breakdown of the loans by the three major durations: three months and five 
and ten years respectively. Of the 785 loans for which I have data, 618 were given for a five year 
period. This represents 78.73% of the Heddesdorf loans. There were also shorter three month 
credits available which were fairly common; 144 of the issued loans, or 18.34% of all loan 
activity, were issued for a three month period. For larger loans, usually those associated with the 
purchase of land or homes, these loans could be extended to a maximum of ten years. Given the 
long average duration of loans (4.22 years) extended by the Heddesdorf cooperative and the 
relatively short withdrawal notice for deposits (6 months), this cooperative was borrowing short 
and lending long, which indicates confidence in eventual loan repayment.  
Finally, both the asymmetric information argument and hypothesis five regarding low 
transaction costs are supported by the low interest rate spread of the Heddesdorf cooperative. 
The cooperative charged 5 percent interest on all loans, irrespective of loan duration or amount. 
The low spread of 0.5 to 1.5 percent between the interest the cooperative charged borrowers 
(5%) and the interest earned by savers (3.5-4.5% for Sparkasse deposits) would only have been 
possible because of low transaction costs and low risk. And the fact that these low interest rates 
were accepted by depositors indicates that these deposits were viewed as very safe, providing a 
further argument that the cooperative had good information over repayment probabilities. 
Finally, the low spread may also reflect the cooperatives’ underlying philosophic principles in 
the sense that members were not concerned primarily with individual profit, but in helping one 
another achieve economic prosperity. 
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As might be expected, the longer the loan term the larger the loan amount tended to be. 
Figures 7 and 8 summarize the key statistics of the loan data by duration. Three month loans 
were issued for an average of 91 marks; five year loans were more than twice as large, averaging 
184 marks; and the rare ten year loans averaged nearly 587 marks. Overall, the mean loan 
amount was 172.75 marks. Borrowers whose loans were coming due could petition the 
cooperative to have their loan extended for three months. This process appears to have been 
relatively simple; 242 loans, or 31 percent, were granted one of these short-term extensions. As 
shown in Table 1, the Heddesdorf cooperative only earned between an average of 4.55 and 29.35 
marks in interest depending on the length of the loan.  Together, the small average loan amount, 
the high amount of loans that were granted extensions, and the low amount of interest earned per 
loan would only have been profitable with low transaction costs, providing strong support for 
hypothesis five. 
All loans extended by the Heddesdorf cooperative also required an upfront payment. For 
10 year loans, this payment was 5 percent of the total, whereas for loans of five or less years the 
required payment was only 3.33 percent.100 Insisting upon an upfront payment helped ensure that 
members were taking loans for productive purposes. The cooperative also mandated that 
borrowers repay their loans in equal annual installments. Raiffeisen believed that this method of 
repayment led “people to thrift more effectively than the obligation to pay in business shares.”101 
Requiring annual payment could also work as a check to ensure that members were on track to 
repay their loan by its due date, giving the cooperative addition information on the status of each 
of its loans.  
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Perhaps one of the most significant differences between Raiffeisen credit cooperatives 
and other financial institutions is that they did not require collateral. Instead, the cooperative 
relied on cosigners to guarantee the loan. In the event of default, these cosigners were 
responsible for the total amount of the loan. The Heddesdorf statutes indicate that a cosigner was 
a member who was considered safe and acceptable provided he or she held real estate of a value 
“at least twice the amount of the loan to be guaranteed.”102 Only ten year loans required the 
provision of additional collateral. Given the small size of most cooperative loans, this meant that 
most members were able to serve as a cosigner. And the use of cosigners in lieu of more 
traditional and secure forms of collateral likely indicates that the cooperative must have had a 
great deal of information about each potential cosigner. Despite the personal risk, an astonishing 
167 of the 250 different debtors in our data set served as a cosigner. This means that over sixty-
five percent of the Heddesdorf members taking out a loan were willing to pledge their assets to 
secure the loans of fellow members.  
Essentially, the relationships between members of the Heddesdorf cooperative meant 
they often acted as debtors, lenders, and cosigners all at the same time. This level of involvement 
was a vital reason why cooperatives limited the information problems associated with acting as a 
delegated monitor, directly supporting hypothesis one. And because a cosigner was directly 
liable for the loan in the event of default, they also had every incentive to monitor that the loan 
was used productively and that the debtor was on track for repayment. The presence of cosigners 
who screened individual borrowers and acted as a delegated monitor through the life of a loan, 
supports hypothesis three, regarding efficient monitoring mechanisms. Ultimately, both 
hypothesis one and three are supported by the fact that the Heddesdorf cooperative appears to 
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have “dispensed with many of the contractual terms that other lenders used to compensate for 
less-than-adequate information and enforcement capabilities” in lieu of cosigners.103  
Finally, the willingness of members to act as cosigners may also reflect the close ties, or 
dense social relationships, which often bound members of the Heddesdorf cooperative. 
Friendships, business relationships, or family ties among the Heddesdorf members appear to 
have been common. Of the 130 debtors that took out multiple loans for example, 60 of them (46 
percent) had the same cosigner for at least two loans. This is significant for two reasons. First, 
over half (52 percent) of members seeking to borrow money from the cooperative did so on more 
than one occasion, and second, many of them relied on the same cosigners to secure each 
additional loan. This provides strong support for hypothesis two, that repeated interactions 
provided an incentive for loan repayment and curtailed shortsighted behavior such as loan 
default in favor of mutually beneficial actions such as repayment.  
The Heddesdorf cooperative also made use of extensive family ties. An astonishing 13.07 
percent of all loans issued to debtors (103 loans) were secured by a cosigner with the same 
surname.  Even though this percentage is somewhat inflated by certain families engaging in 
repeated transactions with one another, the sheer number of these transactions remains 
noteworthy. In addition to supporting hypothesis two about lower monitoring costs, the obvious 
relationship between many borrowers and cosigners likely did create strong social pressure to 
repay one’s loans. The evidence for the third hypothesis becomes even more powerful when 
combined with the repeat transactions between many borrowers and their cosigners. Thus the 
interplay between the long-term interaction view, where repeated interactions sustains the 
cooperative, and arguments for effective repayment mechanisms based on social mechanisms, is 
clearly demonstrated by the Heddesdorf data.   
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The impact of social relationships can also be found in the presence of cosigners who did 
not take out a loan. For Heddesdorf, 50 unique cosigners did not take out a loan in the period in 
question. Unfortunately, the data does not allow analysis of cooperative members who neither 
took loans nor served as a cosigner, but these are likely to have been numerous.104 This limited 
data does indicate that the Heddesdorf cooperative had nonborrowing members, however, 
thereby providing limited support for Guinnane’s assertion that these members served a vital role 
in monitoring the provision and use of loans while simultaneously preventing collusion and 
minimizing asymmetric information between the borrower and the cooperative.  
 
Conclusion 
Ultimately, the business records of the Heddesdorf cooperative provide strong, albeit 
primarily descriptive, support for each of the five hypotheses advanced previously. It appears 
that the Heddesdorf cooperative did indeed have an efficiency advantage over traditional 
financial institutions as a result of its ability to (1) minimize informational asymmetries and (2) 
create effective monitoring and repayment mechanisms, all while (3) lowering transaction costs. 
The result, according to Timothy Guinnane, was that cooperatives were able to “provide loans on 
terms that were impossible for conventional banks.”105 And according to Guinnane, the resulting 
increase in access to credit for many rural Germans allowed them to “adopt the new methods and 
materials required to use best-practice techniques in their branch of agriculture, commerce, or 
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small-scale industrial production,” creating new opportunities and leading, in general, to an 
increase in incomes.106 
As well as utilizing strong social capital mechanisms to their benefit, cooperatives 
created supra-institutions such as Centrals and auditing associations to overcome the liquidity 
and confidence problems inherent in any small, regional microfinance initiative. By mitigating 
financial risks associated with small and geographically restricted loans, Centrals were 
instrumental in attracting deposits while auditing associations provided valuable training and 
oversight. Together, the two “overcame the limitations inherent in the design of any individual 
credit cooperative,” allowing cooperatives to “capitalize on the benefits of their small size and 
local basis while overcoming…the potential weaknesses implicit in those features.”107 Overall, 
cooperatives’ local efficiency advantages and their use of regional institutions inspired 
widespread confidence in their operation. As a result, credit cooperatives have become an 
increasingly important part of many of today’s financial systems. 
The presence of well-run cooperatives has the potential to leave a positive mark on the 
economic and social structure of a given region through the development of “local initiative and 
local economic strength.”108 Throughout this research, it has been our purpose to better 
understand what allowed German credit cooperatives to flourish, in part, because their success 
may reveal lessons for today’s microcredit efforts. The first lesson we can draw from their 
development is that successful cooperative efforts depend on an intimate understanding of local 
context. The Raiffeisen credit cooperatives, for example, developed within a “broader pattern of 
material, institutional, legal, and intellectual changes” that swept through Germany in the 
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decades following the 1848 revolution.109 Only by establishing common operating principles and 
adapting to a constantly changing political and legislative climate did the Raiffeisen movement 
successfully achieve its economic goals. All microfinance institutions, and especially those 
reliant on cooperation or social mechanisms, should therefore have a firm grasp of the specific 
sociopolitical context in which they intend to operate.  
The particular way in which the Raiffeisen cooperative structure and business operations 
allowed it to achieve its efficiency advantages is also potentially important for designing future 
microcredit institutions. But because I have already focused on these structural features in testing 
the five efficiency hypotheses, I will not return to them here. Instead, I want to focus on an 
obvious but underappreciated lesson for the success of all microfinance efforts, which stems 
from the interaction of each of the five hypotheses with one another. This lesson is, simply, the 
importance of the individual relationships and social networks upon which the Raiffeisen 
cooperatives were built in determining its financial success.  
It was only by taking advantage of existing social structures that Raiffeisen cooperatives 
were able to realize their potential efficiency advantages, thereby extending credit to sectors of 
society that traditional financial organizations were either unable or unwilling to lend money too. 
Understanding and adapting to the specific economic needs of its local community also allowed 
the Heddesdorf cooperative to create a network in which each member’s self-interest was tied to 
the success of the broader cooperative. More than any other factor, it may be the mutual self-
interest of members, “who were both well-informed and interested” in the cooperatives’ future, 
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which created the information and enforcement advantages that led to cooperatives’ success over 
the long-term.110 While most modern microfinance efforts are not mutual organizations, they 
nonetheless stand to benefit from incorporating many of the lessons of Germany’s credit 
cooperatives for harnessing social capital and developing the appropriate incentives for ‘good’ 
behavior among members.   
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Figure 4: Net Assets (Deposits – Liabilities) 
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Figure 5: Heddesdorf Loan Activity (Liabilities or Expenditures) 
 
 
Figure 6: Heddesdorf Assets versus Liabilities 
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Summary Table (1): Loan characteristics by duration
78.73%
Loan Duration as a % of Total
0.25 Years
5 Years
Loan 
Duration 
# of 
Loans 
% of Total 
Loans
3 Months 144 18.34%
5 Years 618 78.73%
10 Years 13 1.66%
 
18.34%
0.5 Years 1 Year 3 Years
6 Years 10 Years
 
Average 
Amount 
Interest Rate 
Charged 
Average 
Cumulative 
Interest Earned
 91 marks 5% 4.55 marks
 184 marks 5% 9.20 marks
 587 marks 5% 29.35 marks
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